# Rubric review sheet: Every, 2026

22 selected claims, three bars each. Written before any evidence was gathered. Edit `rubrics.jsonl`, then rerun `check-rubrics` and `sheet`. A flag means the critic check put the bar under even odds of being a fair reading, or doubted it is checkable; it is a prompt to look, not a verdict.
Flags: 38 of 66 bars.


## c30. Dan Shipper: And I think, shockingly, the most addictive technology of 2026—the narrative we might be talking about at the end of th…

> And I think, shockingly, the most addictive technology of 2026—the narrative we might be talking about at the end of the year—is how addictive it is to just make things.

2026-01-05, [Transcript: Reid Hoffman Makes Five Predictions About AI In 2026](https://every.to/podcast/transcript-reid-hoffman-makes-five-predictions-about-ai-in-2026). Rank 2, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. By end of 2026 the dominant tech-addiction narrative will be about compulsive making with AI coding tools (he adds that everyone will be prompting Claude Code), not social media.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | By the end of 2026 the dominant tech-addiction narrative is about how addictive it is to make things with AI, not about social media or AI companions. | Three or more major general-interest outlets (NYT, The Atlantic, WSJ, FT, The Verge, Wired or peers) publishing 2026 pieces on compulsive building with AI coding tools, and at least one year-end piece naming it as the year's addiction story; provisional until December 31. | 0.64 | 0.27 |
| **standard** ⚑ | Multiple major outlets in 2026 described compulsive making with AI coding tools as an addiction or a defining behaviour of the year. | Two or more major outlets, dated 2026. | 0.40 | 0.76 |
| **lenient** ⚑ | At least one major outlet in 2026 described building with AI coding tools as addictive. | One major outlet, dated 2026. | 0.38 | 0.79 |

Notes: 'Shockingly' and 'the narrative' are his framing; the bars count coverage. Spoken on a podcast, so the wording is conversational.

## c8. Willie Williams: A mass-market robotic pet succeeds by the end of 2026.

> A mass-market robotic pet succeeds by the end of 2026.

2025-12-23, [Every's 2026 Predictions](https://every.to/context-window/every-s-2026-predictions). Rank 6, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. The wildcard prediction, stated as the editor's rendering of Williams's view. He names Moflin as the one to watch. 'Succeeds' is undefined.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | A mass-market robotic pet was a clear commercial success in 2026: at least 100,000 units sold in the year. | Unit sales for calendar 2026 per the maker or a major outlet, any launch date; a product sold mainly to institutions does not count as mass-market. | 0.69 | 0.46 |
| **standard** | A consumer robotic pet reached mass-market retail in 2026 and major outlets reported strong sales. | Availability at a major general retailer (Amazon, Target, Best Buy or peers) plus major-outlet reporting of strong sales or sell-outs, dated 2026; maker claims alone are tier 4. | 0.65 | 0.65 |
| **lenient** | A consumer robotic pet was widely covered as a commercial hit in 2026. | Two or more major outlets describing a robotic pet as a hit, dated 2026. | 0.52 | 0.67 |

Notes: 'Succeeds' is undefined in the source; the bars make three readings explicit. He named Moflin as the one to watch, but any consumer robotic pet counts.

## c14. Brandon Gell: agentic development will be maybe by the end of the year inside of the app that you're actually using.

> agentic development will be maybe by the end of the year inside of the app that you're actually using.

2025-12-23, [AI & I: Four Predictions for How AI Will Change Software in 2026 (episode captions)](youtube:srnTvlmTq3U). Rank 7, binary, horizon 2026-12-31. By the end of 2026 users will be able to request features or bug fixes from inside an app and have an agent write and ship the code; unclear whether this means any shipping product or broad availability.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** | By the end of 2026 users of a widely used app can ask for a feature or a fix inside the app and have an agent write and ship the code into the app they are using. | A shipping product with at least one million users offering this to users (not a demo), per the maker's release notes or major-outlet reporting; provisional until December 31. | 0.56 | 0.81 |
| **standard** | By the end of 2026 at least one shipping product lets users request features or fixes in-app and has an agent implement them inside the app. | A generally available product of any size, per release notes or reporting; provisional. | 0.55 | 0.86 |
| **lenient** | By the end of 2026 at least one product shipped or publicly beta-tested in-app agentic development. | A public beta or release, per the maker or reporting; provisional. | 0.64 | 0.85 |

Notes: He hedged with 'maybe'; the bars grade the outcome, not the hedge. Every's own products count if they shipped it.

## c6. Kate Lee: Kate expects most companies to have at least one dedicated role focused on building and maintaining internal AI systems…

> Kate expects most companies to have at least one dedicated role focused on building and maintaining internal AI systems by 2026—“someone whose job is to continuously optimize how the organization uses AI.”

2025-12-23, [Every's 2026 Predictions](https://every.to/context-window/every-s-2026-predictions). Rank 8, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Prediction 2 of 3. Editor's paraphrase plus a direct quote. 'Most companies' is the checkable element; the bars will need a survey or job-posting measure.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | By 2026 most companies have at least one dedicated role for building and maintaining internal AI systems. | A reputable 2026 survey (McKinsey, Gartner, Deloitte, LinkedIn Economic Graph or peers) finding more than 50% of surveyed companies have such a role. | 0.61 | 0.27 |
| **standard** ⚑ | By 2026 most large companies have a dedicated internal-AI role, or the role is described as standard practice at large companies. | A reputable 2026 survey of companies with 1,000 or more employees finding a majority have the role, or major-outlet reporting describing the head-of-AI or AI-operations role as standard at most large companies. | 0.40 | 0.37 |
| **lenient** ⚑ | Dedicated internal-AI roles grew substantially in 2026 and are common at large companies. | Reputable 2026 data showing dedicated AI-role postings up at least 50% year over year, or at least a third of large companies with the role. | 0.29 | 0.36 |

Notes: 'Most companies' is the checkable element; strict holds her to it, standard narrows to large companies, lenient to a strong trend.

## c3. Natalia Quintero: Natalia thinks the most advanced companies will have agentic workflows embedded in daily operations by year’s end

> Natalia thinks the most advanced companies will have agentic workflows embedded in daily operations by year’s end

2025-12-23, [Every's 2026 Predictions](https://every.to/context-window/every-s-2026-predictions). Rank 10, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Prediction 1 of 3. Editor's paraphrase of Quintero (Every's head of consulting). Leading companies run agentic workflows in day-to-day operations by end of 2026, with finance named as the example industry.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | By the end of 2026 the most advanced companies run agentic workflows in daily operations, not pilots, with finance leading. | At least three Fortune 500 companies or top-tier financial firms publicly describing agents running in daily operational workflows in 2026, at least one of them in finance, per company statements or major outlets; provisional until December 31. | 0.20 | 0.23 |
| **standard** ⚑ | By the end of 2026 several large companies run agentic workflows in daily operations. | At least three large companies in any sector, per company statements or reputable reporting dated 2026; provisional. | 0.46 | 0.35 |
| **lenient** | In 2026 at least one large company publicly moved an agentic workflow from pilot into daily operations. | Company statement or reputable reporting dated 2026. | 0.59 | 0.89 |

Notes: Editor's paraphrase of Quintero. 'Most advanced companies' is read as leading large firms; the finance clause is required only at strict.

## c5. Dan Shipper: Dan predicts a third kind of engineer: agentic engineers who fully delegate implementation to AI and move up a level to…

> Dan predicts a third kind of engineer: agentic engineers who fully delegate implementation to AI and move up a level to managing and orchestrating agents.

2025-12-23, [Every's 2026 Predictions](https://every.to/context-window/every-s-2026-predictions). Rank 12, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Prediction 2 of 3, 'New roles are emerging'. Editor's paraphrase. A recognised job category of engineers who direct agents rather than write code emerges in 2026.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | In 2026 the agentic engineer, who delegates implementation to AI and manages agents instead of writing code, became a recognised third kind of engineering role. | Job postings using 'agentic engineer', 'AI engineer (agent orchestration)' or an equivalent title at three or more well-known companies in 2026, plus recognition as a distinct role by a major outlet or an industry survey (Stack Overflow, LinkedIn). | 0.66 | 0.36 |
| **standard** | In 2026 job postings or major-outlet coverage recognised engineers who direct agents rather than write code as a distinct role. | Postings at named companies or major-outlet coverage dated 2026. | 0.70 | 0.70 |
| **lenient** | In 2026 at least one named company hired for, or a widely read piece described, engineers whose job is directing agents rather than writing code. | One named company's posting or one widely read piece dated 2026. | 0.61 | 0.84 |

Notes: Editor's paraphrase. The spoken version (c21, 'a big deal in 2026') is folded into this claim.

## c1. Dan Shipper: Anything a user can do in an app, an agent can also do. Then anything the app can do, the agent can do. Eventually, any…

> Anything a user can do in an app, an agent can also do. Then anything the app can do, the agent can do. Eventually, anything a developer can do—changing logic, fixing bugs, customizing behavior—will be something the agent handles on the user’s behalf.

2025-12-23, [Every's 2026 Predictions](https://every.to/context-window/every-s-2026-predictions). Rank 13, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Prediction 1 of 3, 'Agents become infrastructure'. A staged claim about how software gets built; the first stage (agents can do anything a user can in an app) is the checkable 2026 part, the 'eventually' stage has no date.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** | In 2026 agents can do anything a user can do in several major apps, and at least one shipping product already lets agents do what a developer does: change the app's own logic for the user. | Stage one: three or more major apps (from Microsoft, Google, Apple, Salesforce, Adobe, Meta, Notion, Figma or peers) shipping agents that can perform any user action end to end, per releases or reporting dated 2026. Stage three: one generally available product where an agent modifies the app's behaviour or code on the user's behalf; provisional until December 31. | 0.51 | 0.79 |
| **standard** | In 2026 agents can do anything a user can do in several major apps. | Three or more major apps with agents able to perform the main user actions end to end, per releases or reporting dated 2026; provisional. | 0.51 | 0.52 |
| **lenient** | In 2026 at least one major app beyond coding tools shipped an agent that can do most of what a user can do in it. | One major non-coding app, per release notes or reporting dated 2026; provisional. | 0.58 | 0.59 |

Notes: A staged claim; only the first stage carries a 2026 reading, so strict adds the third stage as a stretch and standard grades stage one. The spoken version (c15) is folded in.

## c28. Dan Shipper: I would guess that they will find it valuable this year. Um specifically because coding agents are good enough that onc…

> I would guess that they will find it valuable this year. Um specifically because coding agents are good enough that once they make their way into Excel in a widely distributed way

2025-12-23, [AI & I: Four Predictions for How AI Will Change Software in 2026 (episode captions)](youtube:srnTvlmTq3U). Rank 14, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Non-technical knowledge workers (the example is a deal-desk analyst living in Excel) will find AI genuinely valuable at work in 2026 once coding-agent capability is widely distributed inside Excel.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | In 2026 coding agents reached Excel in a widely distributed way and non-technical knowledge workers found AI genuinely valuable at work. | Microsoft shipping agent or code-generation capability in Excel to general availability for Microsoft 365 commercial users in 2026, plus a reputable 2026 survey showing a majority of non-technical knowledge workers rating AI as valuable or useful in their work. | 0.53 | 0.31 |
| **standard** ⚑ | In 2026 agent capability shipped broadly in Excel and reported value among non-technical workers rose. | Excel agent GA in 2026 per Microsoft, plus any reputable 2026 survey showing a year-over-year rise in workers reporting AI as useful. | 0.65 | 0.41 |
| **lenient** ⚑ | In 2026 Microsoft shipped agent or coding capability in Excel to general availability. | Microsoft release notes or major-outlet reporting dated 2026. | 0.47 | 0.95 |

Notes: Spoken; the Excel clause is the concrete mechanism he named, so it anchors every bar.

## c41. Reid Hoffman (guest): I don’t think any of the horses that are in the race will particularly stumble. I don’t think you’ll look up and go, Wo…

> I don’t think any of the horses that are in the race will particularly stumble. I don’t think you’ll look up and go, Wow, I thought Cursor was fantastic—and it’s just gone.

2026-01-05, [Transcript: Reid Hoffman Makes Five Predictions About AI In 2026](https://every.to/podcast/transcript-reid-hoffman-makes-five-predictions-about-ai-in-2026). Rank 15, binary, horizon 2026-12-31. None of the current coding-agent leaders will collapse or exit the market during 2026. Hoffman: none of the coding-agent leaders will stumble. Pinned because it directly contradicts Shipper's own Cursor call (c31).

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | None of the coding-agent leaders stumbled in 2026: every one is still operating independently with no major shutdown, distressed sale or collapse in revenue. | Anthropic (Claude Code), OpenAI (Codex), Google (Gemini CLI), Cursor, Cognition (Windsurf), Replit and Lovable, checked against reputable 2026 reporting for shutdowns, distressed acquisitions, or a reported revenue or usage decline of 50% or more; provisional until December 31. | 0.46 | 0.48 |
| **standard** ⚑ | None of the coding-agent leaders shut down, was acquired in distress or lost most of its users or revenue in 2026. | Same list, reputable reporting dated 2026; provisional. | 0.47 | 0.39 |
| **lenient** ⚑ | None of the coding-agent leaders shut down or was sold in distress in 2026. | Same list, reputable reporting dated 2026; provisional. | 0.40 | 0.55 |

Notes: Guest claim (Reid Hoffman), pinned because it directly contradicts the host's own Cursor call (c31). Graded apart from Every's claims.

## c12. Dan Shipper: What we're doing next year is um we're going to build this like unified memory and context layer where we have um we ha…

> What we're doing next year is um we're going to build this like unified memory and context layer where we have um we have a bunch of uh basically we can collect everything everything that you care about and who you are into one place and all of the apps and all the content can take that into account as they work with you.

2025-12-23, [AI & I: Four Predictions for How AI Will Change Software in 2026 (episode captions)](youtube:srnTvlmTq3U). Rank 17, binary, horizon 2026-12-31. Every will ship a unified memory and context layer across its apps in 2026; this is a company plan rather than an industry forecast.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** | Every shipped a unified memory and context layer shared across its apps to users in 2026. | An Every announcement or release in 2026 of a memory or context layer used by at least two of Cora, Spiral, Sparkle and Monologue, available to customers; provisional until December 31. | 0.58 | 0.72 |
| **standard** | Every publicly launched a cross-app memory or context feature in 2026, as a release or a customer beta. | Every announcement, release notes or reporting dated 2026; provisional. | 0.52 | 0.84 |
| **lenient** ⚑ | Every publicly showed progress on a cross-app memory layer in 2026. | A shipped feature in one Every app that shares context with another, or a public demo or announcement, dated 2026; provisional. | 0.40 | 0.61 |

Notes: A company plan rather than an industry forecast; included because he stated it as what Every will do next year.

## c32. Reid Hoffman (guest): But I think next year is going to be much more negative on AI than this year, in general popular discourse.

> But I think next year is going to be much more negative on AI than this year, in general popular discourse.

2026-01-05, [Transcript: Reid Hoffman Makes Five Predictions About AI In 2026](https://every.to/podcast/transcript-reid-hoffman-makes-five-predictions-about-ai-in-2026). Rank 20, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Popular discourse about AI in 2026 will be much more negative than in 2025. Hoffman: 2026 discourse much more negative on AI. Pinned as a guest claim for contrast with the hosts' optimism.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | Popular discourse on AI was much more negative in 2026 than in 2025. | Reputable 2026 polling (Pew, Gallup, YouGov or peers) showing the share of US adults with negative views of AI up at least five points from 2025, plus a media-sentiment analysis showing more negative coverage; provisional until December 31. | 0.69 | 0.44 |
| **standard** ⚑ | Popular discourse on AI was more negative in 2026 than in 2025. | Reputable 2026 polling showing any decline in favourability versus 2025, or a media-sentiment analysis showing more negative coverage; provisional. | 0.77 | 0.45 |
| **lenient** | Major outlets in 2026 described a backlash or a souring public mood toward AI. | Two or more major outlets dated 2026. | 0.58 | 0.61 |

Notes: Guest claim (Reid Hoffman), pinned for contrast with the hosts' optimism. Graded apart from Every's claims.

## c2. Kieran Klaassen: 2026 is when agents go mainstream.

> 2026 is when agents go mainstream.

2025-12-23, [Every's 2026 Predictions](https://every.to/context-window/every-s-2026-predictions). Rank 22, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Prediction 1 of 3. Editor's one-line rendering of Klaassen's view ('Kieran puts it simply'), not a direct quote. 'Mainstream' is undefined; the bars will need an adoption measure.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** | 2026 is the year agents went mainstream: a majority of US adults or US workers used an AI agent during the year. | A reputable 2026 survey (Pew, Gallup, McKinsey, Microsoft Work Trend Index or peers) with a majority reporting use of an AI that takes multi-step actions on their behalf; provisional until December 31. | 0.60 | 0.72 |
| **standard** ⚑ | In 2026 agent features reached hundreds of millions of people and the year was described as the one agents went mainstream. | Agent features generally available by default in at least two of ChatGPT, Gemini, Copilot, iOS or Android in 2026, plus major-outlet year-end coverage describing agents as mainstream; provisional. | 0.45 | 0.62 |
| **lenient** | In 2026 agent features became generally available, not waitlisted, in at least two of the most-used consumer AI products. | Release notes or reporting dated 2026 for ChatGPT, Gemini, Copilot, Claude, iOS or Android. | 0.51 | 0.73 |

Notes: Editor's one-line rendering of Klaassen's view. 'Mainstream' is given an adoption measure.

## c7. Dan Shipper: There’s a whole class of highly creative, highly visual people who have been held back from making full experiences bec…

> There’s a whole class of highly creative, highly visual people who have been held back from making full experiences because they can’t code. Now they’re going to be able to code.

2025-12-23, [Every's 2026 Predictions](https://every.to/context-window/every-s-2026-predictions). Rank 23, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Prediction 3 of 3, 'Designers become superheroes'. Designers and other non-coders ship working software with AI tools in 2026.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | In 2026 a large share of designers and other visual creatives shipped working software without writing code. | A reputable 2026 survey of designers (Figma, Stack Overflow, UX Collective or peers) finding at least a third shipped working apps or features with AI tools without hand-writing code. | 0.65 | 0.29 |
| **standard** ⚑ | In 2026 designers shipped working apps with AI tools at scale. | A major design or AI-coding tool reporting millions of designer-built apps or a large rise in non-engineer builders in 2026, or a reputable survey showing a substantial increase, per company data or major outlets. | 0.58 | 0.47 |
| **lenient** | Major outlets in 2026 reported designers building and shipping software with AI coding tools as an established trend. | Two or more major outlets dated 2026. | 0.61 | 0.76 |

Notes: The spoken version (c16, 'designers going crazy') is folded in. 'Now they're going to be able to code' is read as shipping working software, not learning to write code.

## c10. Dan Shipper: AGI, however you define that, is a lot more complicated and hard than we thought. And we will not have AGI in 2027.

> AGI, however you define that, is a lot more complicated and hard than we thought. And we will not have AGI in 2027.

2025-12-23, [AI & I: Four Predictions for How AI Will Change Software in 2026 (episode captions)](youtube:srnTvlmTq3U). Rank 24, binary, horizon 2027-12-31. No AGI by 2027; the horizon is a year past the target year and AGI is explicitly left undefined, so a 2026 check can only falsify it if AGI is widely agreed to have arrived.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | We will not have AGI in 2027. | No major lab has declared AGI achieved with broad agreement among independent experts, per reputable reporting; open until 2027-12-31, so any 2026 grade is provisional and can only record that the claim has not been falsified so far. | 0.56 | 0.19 |
| **standard** ⚑ | We will not have AGI in 2027. | Same; provisional until 2027-12-31. | 0.64 | 0.17 |
| **lenient** ⚑ | We will not have AGI in 2027. | Same; provisional until 2027-12-31. | 0.65 | 0.20 |

Notes: Binary and about 2027, so the three bars are identical and the horizon is a year past the target year. Kept because it is one of the few hard-edged claims in the set.

## c29. Dan Shipper: So I think that's going to actually happen a lot more in in 2026 is is we're going to um use training approaches and ar…

> So I think that's going to actually happen a lot more in in 2026 is is we're going to um use training approaches and architectures that allow them to like go off and do stuff.

2025-12-23, [AI & I: Four Predictions for How AI Will Change Software in 2026 (episode captions)](youtube:srnTvlmTq3U). Rank 27, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. In 2026 labs will adopt training approaches and architectures that give agents more independence (loosening obedience-style alignment); the speaker calls it 'a very vague prediction'.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | In 2026 labs adopted training approaches and architectures that let agents go off and do things on their own for much longer. | At least two major labs publicly describing training for longer autonomous operation in 2026 (model cards, research posts), and an independent measurement (METR's time-horizon work or similar) showing the autonomous task length frontier at least doubled during 2026. | 0.59 | 0.43 |
| **standard** | In 2026 agents' autonomous task horizons grew substantially, or major labs shipped models marketed on longer independent operation. | An independent measurement showing roughly a doubling in 2026, or two major labs' releases dated 2026 marketed on autonomous multi-hour operation. | 0.71 | 0.64 |
| **lenient** ⚑ | In 2026 at least one major lab shipped a model marketed on longer autonomous agent operation. | Release notes or announcement dated 2026. | 0.49 | 0.85 |

Notes: He called it 'a very vague prediction'; the measure gives it an edge via independent time-horizon measurements.

## c26. Dan Shipper: I think we will definitely see um layoffs that companies blame on AI um in 2026

> I think we will definitely see um layoffs that companies blame on AI um in 2026

2025-12-23, [AI & I: Four Predictions for How AI Will Change Software in 2026 (episode captions)](youtube:srnTvlmTq3U). Rank 28, binary, horizon 2026-12-31. In 2026 companies will announce layoffs and publicly attribute them to AI.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** | In 2026 several large companies announced layoffs and blamed them on AI. | At least five companies with 1,000 or more employees announcing layoffs in 2026 and explicitly attributing them to AI, per company statements or major outlets. | 0.64 | 0.92 |
| **standard** | In 2026 multiple large companies announced layoffs and blamed them on AI. | At least three such companies, per company statements or major outlets dated 2026. | 0.76 | 0.93 |
| **lenient** | In 2026 at least one large company explicitly blamed AI for layoffs. | One company with 1,000 or more employees, per its statement or a major outlet dated 2026. | 0.75 | 0.94 |

Notes: 'Definitely' and 'layoffs that companies blame on AI' are his words; the bars count companies.

## c27. Dan Shipper: and I think mostly they will not be actually AI related they will be about the underlying business but they'll use AI a…

> and I think mostly they will not be actually AI related they will be about the underlying business but they'll use AI as a good excuse.

2025-12-23, [AI & I: Four Predictions for How AI Will Change Software in 2026 (episode captions)](youtube:srnTvlmTq3U). Rank 31, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Most 2026 layoffs blamed on AI will really be driven by underlying business problems, with AI used as cover; judging the true cause is inherently contestable.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | Most 2026 layoffs blamed on AI were really driven by the underlying business, with AI used as the excuse. | A reputable 2026 analysis (Challenger, an academic or Fed study, or a major-outlet investigation) concluding that most AI-attributed layoffs of 2026 were primarily driven by other factors. | 0.75 | 0.13 |
| **standard** | Reputable analysis in 2026 found that AI-attributed layoffs were largely driven by other factors. | At least one reputable analysis or investigation dated 2026 reaching that conclusion ('AI-washing'). | 0.63 | 0.50 |
| **lenient** | In 2026 economists or analysts publicly doubted that AI was the real cause of layoffs announced as AI-driven. | Major-outlet reporting of such scepticism dated 2026. | 0.60 | 0.67 |

Notes: Judging the true cause of a layoff is contestable; the bars rely on independent analysis rather than our own reading.

## c13. Dan Shipper: I think we'll hire next year, but I don't think we're going to hire a ton. Like the whole thing is like keep it small.

> I think we'll hire next year, but I don't think we're going to hire a ton. Like the whole thing is like keep it small.

2025-12-23, [AI & I: Four Predictions for How AI Will Change Software in 2026 (episode captions)](youtube:srnTvlmTq3U). Rank 33, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Every will add staff in 2026 but not many, staying a small company; 'a ton' is undefined (they were at about 20 people).

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | Every hired in 2026 but stayed small, adding only a handful of people. | Net headcount growth in 2026 under 10 people, from about 20 at the end of 2025, per Every's statements, team page or LinkedIn; provisional until December 31. | 0.44 | 0.38 |
| **standard** ⚑ | Every added staff in 2026 and remained a small company. | Headcount at the latest 2026 reading above end-2025 and below 35; provisional. | 0.30 | 0.20 |
| **lenient** ⚑ | Every remained a small company through 2026. | Headcount at the latest 2026 reading below 50; provisional. | 0.31 | 0.36 |

Notes: A company plan. 'A ton' is undefined; the bars give it numbers relative to the roughly 20 people Every had.

## c11. Dan Shipper: if you are an engineer who wants to incorporate AI into your process but doesn't want to reinvent the skill of software…

> if you are an engineer who wants to incorporate AI into your process but doesn't want to reinvent the skill of software engineering there's going to be a home and a job for you for a very long time.

2025-12-23, [AI & I: Four Predictions for How AI Will Change Software in 2026 (episode captions)](youtube:srnTvlmTq3U). Rank 38, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Traditional engineers who use AI as an accelerant will keep having jobs; 'a very long time' has no end date, so a 2026 check is only whether that job category visibly persisted.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** | In 2026 engineers who use AI as an accelerant without reinventing their craft still had a home and a job: traditional software roles did not shrink meaningfully. | BLS software-developer employment and Indeed software-development postings both down less than 10% year over year at the latest 2026 reading, with traditional engineering still the majority of software postings. | 0.54 | 0.58 |
| **standard** | In 2026 traditional software-engineering roles remained widely available and were not in collapse. | BLS or Indeed data showing a year-over-year decline of less than 20% in software-developer employment or postings at the latest 2026 reading. | 0.72 | 0.65 |
| **lenient** | In 2026 traditional software engineers were still being hired at scale. | Indeed or LinkedIn postings data showing substantial continued hiring for software developers in 2026. | 0.64 | 0.66 |

Notes: 'A very long time' has no end date, so a 2026 check is weak by nature; the bars test only that the job category visibly persisted this year.

## c18. Brandon Gell: I think midterms are going to be like kind of scary. Um because I think there's going to be deep fakes, which used to b…

> I think midterms are going to be like kind of scary. Um because I think there's going to be deep fakes, which used to be a really scary word and now nobody talks about nobody says deep fake anymore.

2025-12-23, [AI & I: Four Predictions for How AI Will Change Software in 2026 (episode captions)](youtube:srnTvlmTq3U). Rank 43, spectrum, horizon 2026-11-03. AI deepfakes will be a significant, alarming feature of the 2026 US midterm elections.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** | AI deepfakes were a significant, widely covered part of the 2026 midterms. | At least three documented deepfake incidents involving candidates in major 2026 races covered by major outlets, at least one with reach of a million views or an official response (platform takedown, regulator or campaign action); open until November 3, so provisional. | 0.53 | 0.58 |
| **standard** ⚑ | Multiple documented deepfake incidents involving 2026 midterm candidates were covered by major outlets. | Two or more incidents, major-outlet reporting dated 2026; provisional. | 0.27 | 0.88 |
| **lenient** ⚑ | At least one documented deepfake incident involving a 2026 midterm candidate was covered by a major outlet. | One incident, major-outlet reporting dated 2026; provisional. | 0.29 | 0.91 |

Notes: 'Kind of scary' is read as significant and widely covered. Horizon is election day.

## c22. Dan Shipper: if you then zoom out though that kind that style of engineering is going to be on a pretty slow and steady decline.

> if you then zoom out though that kind that style of engineering is going to be on a pretty slow and steady decline.

2025-12-23, [AI & I: Four Predictions for How AI Will Change Software in 2026 (episode captions)](youtube:srnTvlmTq3U). Rank 44, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Traditional software engineering with AI as an accelerant begins a slow, steady decline (newspaper-industry analogy); a slow decline is hard to confirm or deny within one year.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | Demand for traditional, code-writing software engineering declined in 2026, with AI coding agents named as a cause. | Indeed software-development postings and BLS software-developer employment both lower at the latest 2026 reading than a year earlier, plus major-outlet reporting attributing part of the decline to AI coding agents. | 0.29 | 0.57 |
| **standard** ⚑ | Demand for traditional software engineering declined in 2026. | Indeed software-development postings or BLS software-developer employment lower at the latest 2026 reading than a year earlier. | 0.34 | 0.56 |
| **lenient** | Reputable 2026 data or reporting described a decline in demand for traditional code-writing engineering roles. | Indeed, LinkedIn, BLS or major-outlet reporting dated 2026. | 0.56 | 0.67 |

Notes: 'Slow and steady decline' is a multi-year claim; 2026 is one data point and the grade says only whether the year was consistent with it.

## c31. Dan Shipper: And I think that’s going to hamper their product direction and velocity in a way that—if we look back in a couple years…

> And I think that’s going to hamper their product direction and velocity in a way that—if we look back in a couple years—we might say: that was an interesting era. It’s still a widely distributed piece of software, but it’s not the next-generation thing that we thought it was.

2026-01-05, [Transcript: Reid Hoffman Makes Five Predictions About AI In 2026](https://every.to/podcast/transcript-reid-hoffman-makes-five-predictions-about-ai-in-2026). Rank 47, spectrum, horizon 2026-12-31. Cursor is the coding-agent leader most likely to stumble, caught between the IDE-plus-AI paradigm and the Claude Code paradigm; the stated horizon is 'a couple years', so an end-2026 check is partial.

| Bar | What counts | How we look | Critic | Checkable |
|---|---|---|---:|---:|
| **strict** ⚑ | Cursor stumbled in 2026: its growth stalled or reversed, or it took a down round, a distressed sale or a strategy-driven leadership exit. | Reputable 2026 reporting (The Information, Bloomberg, Reuters, WSJ or peers) of flat or falling revenue or usage, a down round, a distressed acquisition, or a senior exit tied to strategy; provisional until December 31. | 0.26 | 0.61 |
| **standard** ⚑ | In 2026 Cursor lost momentum to agent-first coding tools, with slowing growth or a strategic pivot away from the IDE. | Reputable 2026 reporting describing slowing growth, share loss to Claude Code or Codex, or a pivot; provisional. | 0.48 | 0.40 |
| **lenient** ⚑ | In 2026 Cursor was described as under competitive pressure from agent-first coding tools. | Reputable 2026 reporting. | 0.22 | 0.47 |

Notes: He gave a 'couple years' horizon, so a 2026 grade is partial. Pairs with Hoffman's c41, which predicts none of the leaders stumble.